Hawk or Dove? Examining the Trump Administration’s Reversal of its China Policy
When the Trump Administration released its it was missing several themes that usually carry over no matter who controls the White House, ‘live and let live’ approach. It spent far more time outlining support for the European far-right in the fight against “civilizational erasure” than assessing the United States’ position in relation to its two biggest adversaries.
Furthermore, the document frames the status of Taiwan, which used to be one of the main points of tension between the United States and China, in terms of American economic interests in the semiconductor industry and access to the Taiwan Strait. Historically, the US grounded support for Taiwan in shared democratic values and the principle that the dispute with mainland China deserves a peaceful, non-coercive resolution. Trump’s foreign policy has always been somewhat transactional; he has rarely shied away from taking a hawkish stance on China. However, Trump is planning to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping in less than a month, so it seems worthwhile to examine the current status of the US-China relationship and how it came to be.
Unlike Russia, which has few major exports besides oil, the US cannot isolate China because doing so would jeopardize the delicate web of economic ties both states rely on. From an American perspective, China policy is a constant trade-off between the economic upsides and national security downsides of cooperation. The US needs access to China’s rare earth minerals, but the price of that access is allowing China access to essential computer chips made by US companies.
The Trump administration has calculated that trade-off to be worth it. Although China has been subject to a rollercoaster of tariffs– both real and threatened– since January 2025, on balance it is doing better than one might expect compared to the hit that traditional allies like Brazil and India have taken from US tariffs. Similarly, while Trump’s rhetoric on China is never quite predictable, it softened somewhat since his 2016 campaign and first term. The reasons he and his cabinet have decided to rein it in boil down to domestic messaging strategy and policy priorities.
By now, most analysts have concluded that Trump’s second election victory is owed to his promises to restrict immigration and bring down prices. Americans rarely describe their voting decisions as riding on foreign policy, and aside from vague promises to end wars, Trump’s 2024 campaign was primarily focused on domestic issues. As such, the White House has very little mandate press the China issue; in fact, popular disapproval of China has trended down since 2024. The foreign policy approach most popular with the MAGA base is most likely the one outlined in the National Security Strategy of exporting the domestic culture war to Europe. Being a hawk is simply not popular.
Not only is being a hawk low on the priority list, but risking a highly publicized tariff war with China– especially less than a year out from midterms– would just be bad politics. Between incursions into Venezuela and the Middle East, whatever mandate Trump might have claimed in the post-election months to justify extreme foreign policy shifts has been squandered. Those entanglements have done nothing to advance the stated goals of this administration, and patience is clearly wearing thin. To say the economy has improved as promised this term is at very least a bold statement, but regardless, Trump and the Republican party have continued to emphasize lowering prices. Risking a deterioration in relations with China over Taiwan, chip access, the South China Sea, or any other hot button issue would have economic consequences the GOP cannot afford.
Nonetheless, that calculus may change. A shift in the White House inner circle or agency leaders could result in a corresponding shakeup in America’s foreign policy and security strategies. Additionally, China’s economy has begun to experience slower growth. History suggests that as a result, Xi Jinping and other leaders of the CCP may be inclined to respond drastically to try and rechart their economic course and hold on to domestic support. In that case, a Trump White House or future administration would be pressured to respond in kind, disrupting the fragile balance that currently exists. However, at present it seems in both leaders’ best interests to use their upcoming summit to preserve that balance.
Image courtesy of Daniel Torok via Wikimedia Commons, ©2025. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
