With the Exit of US Forces, a New Phase in Iraq’s Battle for Sovereignty Has Begun.
On the evening of 30 September, the Baghdad sky exploded in colour; fireworks popped and fizzled as the city’s streets became a collage of red, green, black, and white. The celebration heralded the beginning of the country’s ‘Sovereignty Days,’ a four-day public holiday announced by Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi in recognition of the formal withdrawal of American forces from the country. After all, it was the end of an era— one that began 12 years ago with the return of American troops to Iraq and the initiation of Operation Inherent Resolve. Now, it was all over. Washington had declared a lasting victory over the Islamic State (IS); no longer would the Stars and Stripes fly over Erbil Airbase.
However, this celebration veils a significant fissure: the lingering and malevolent role of non-state militias which remain lethally outside of the Iraqi government’s control, including Iranian-aligned militia groups known as IAMGs. While these militias had once served as important allies to Iraq, particularly in the global fight against IS, IAMGs became increasingly entrenched in Iraqi political affairs following the Islamic State’s territorial defeat in 2017 and continue to receive funds, training, and arms from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
Indeed, the extent to which these militias have cemented themselves in Iraqi politics triggered US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s recent proclamation that Iraq is at risk of ‘Balkanization.’ After all, the celebrations in Baghdad coincided with the deadline originally set for the militias’ disarmament, which was instead abruptly pushed back by al-Zaidi just days earlier. This was unsurprising; while the American presence on Iraqi soil was the publicly-stated raison d’etre for many of the IAMGs, prominent– and heavily armed– militias such as Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada rejected the Prime Minister’s deadline when it was originally announced. For now, the country must continue to navigate a high-stakes balancing act that risks grave consequences not only for Iraq’s stability, but also the broader region.
Since the initiation of the US and Israel’s conflict with Iran earlier this year, Iraq’s IAMGs have proven their worth as a mechanism of Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance.’ In March, a militia claimed a drone attack on Kuwait; recently, Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia have also been the targets of such attacks. Most notably, in mid-September, a drone strike led to the temporary closure of Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline, which moves up to five per cent of the global oil supply. While an investigation into the attack is ongoing, Riyadh continues to claim that the drone was launched from inside Iraq. These attacks, in combination with ones on American facilities inside Iraq — a drone strike in March damaged the American diplomatic and logistics hub at the Baghdad airport— have led the US and Saudi Arabia to respond with strikes of their own. Iraqi journalist Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, reflecting on his country’s predicament for The Guardian, put it best, declaring that ‘with the outbreak of this year’s war, Iraq’s balancing act between the two antagonists has collapsed, exposing a perilously fragile state.’ This is the Iraq that al-Zaidi, a political novice (prior to being elected in May, he had never held office), has inherited. So presents the question: what exactly is the plan?
When announcing the extension of the disarmament deadline, al-Zaidi also declared that the IAMGs had agreed to a 90-day ceasefire. Following that ceasefire, he continued, the militias would begin to hand over their weapons, with June 2027 as the final deadline. This is problematic as al-Zaidi has allocated the responsibility of both documenting and collecting militia weapons to the administrative body of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). The PMF, an umbrella network of several dozen militia factions, is dominated by the very groups the government is seeking to disarm in the first place; prominent PMF factions such as the Badr Organization and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq claim allegiance to Tehran. Despite its strong Iranian ties, the PMF is frequently described as an official component of Iraq’s security apparatus. Even more alarmingly, al-Zaidi has voiced intentions to introduce legislation to not only strengthen but to institutionalize the PMF, even though such legislation would directly contradict Iraq’s constitution. As former Iraqi politician Entifadh Qanbar pointed out in April, the Iraqi constitution both ‘prohibits the formation of militias outside the armed forces’ and ‘establishes constitutional supremacy over legislation.’
Simply put, the existence of Iranian-aligned militias within Iraq’s borders presents serious security risks which Baghdad, and the greater region, have already paid a steep price for. Unless the future diverges sharply from the past, the Iraqi government’s proposed roadmap for disarmament can only be a blueprint for disaster. Al-Zaidi must seriously reconsider his approach to Iraq’s militia problem. However, this should not be a problem that he alone should have to manage, especially with the Americans’ recent exit. Indeed, al-Zaidi might even view his proposal as the least unpalatable of the options currently available. Then, what —or perhaps more specifically, who— should fill the gap?
Nothing in the region occurs in isolation; the IAMGs’ attacks on Kuwait, Jordan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are direct evidence of that. Therefore, it is not hard to imagine that these countries, all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have a deeply vested interest in the disarmament of Iraq’s militias. While Iraq’s Shiite majority has historically prevented its consideration for GCC membership –apart from Oman, all GCC countries are Sunni-dominated– it is important to recognize other commonalities, such as a shared Arab identity. An even stronger argument for increased GCC engagement with Baghdad is that the departure of American forces created a power vacuum that, if the GCC does not flex into, Iran will fill.
This is not to say that Iraq should be offered GCC membership. Rather, given the obvious upsides for the GCC in resolving Iraq’s militia dilemma, its members should provide al-Zaidi with concrete incentives to pursue disarmament. These incentives could take many forms, including the GCC shouldering part of the economic cost of disarmament, or even organizing opportunities for intelligence sharing and joint-military initiatives. In short, Iraq’s neighbors clearly recognize that the IAMGs’ disarmament is in their best interest. The GCC, therefore, must begin to apply greater pressure on al-Zaidi— not necessarily in the form of the sticks of coercion, but instead through the carrots of incentives.
But, for now, Baghdad will continue to celebrate. Yet when the final firework fizzles out, the Iraqi government will no longer be able to distract the country —and the region for that matter— from its militia juggling act, for it is one that, ironically, continues to undermine its very sovereignty.
Image courtesy of Daniel Torok (The White House) via Flickr, ©2026. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
