Rubio vs Vance: The Future of Republican Foreign Policy
In November 2025, the Trump administration released the latest iteration of the National Security Strategy (NSS). Published periodically by each successive administration, these documents ostensibly lay out the foremost global threats identified by the administration to the nation’s interests. However, while dramatically altering the traditional commitments of American foreign policy, the latest National Security Strategy offers little insight into the administration's constructive vision for a reformed foreign policy model. It does, however, reveal a fundamental ideological divide within the current Trump administration, embodied by the two figures poised to take up the MAGA movement’s mantle in 2028: Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance.
Both men agree on one fundamental point: The post-Cold War liberal-internationalist foreign policy is no longer viable. Departing from previous governments’ emphasis on American global leadership and the promotion of democracy, the most recent NSS instead focuses on American self-interest and transactionalism. Nonetheless, the stark differences between their competing visions will ultimately shape the course of Republican foreign policy in a post-Trump era.
J.D. Vance appears to be Trump’s obvious successor. Not only is there a strong precedent for Vice Presidents succeeding their former bosses, but he has consistently dominated republican opinion polls by staggering margins. Like Trump, Vance’s alignment with the nationalistic wing of the party has rendered him highly critical of American foreign involvement, condemning the American forever wars begun by George Bush in the wake of 9/11. Vance’s foreign policy is ultimately one of restraint-realism, framed within the American domestic context, with diminished emphasis on great-power competition and on supporting overseas allies. with a diminished emphasis on great-power competition and supporting overseas allies.
Informed by his service in Iraq, Vance consistently opposed intervention in the Middle East during his tenure in the Senate, frequently criticizing military measures he deemed irrelevant to average Americans' interests. While Trump has departed from this line and struck sites in both Iran and Yemen, Vance has remained critical. The 2025 leak of an administration Signal group chat demonstrates Vance’s firm opposition to any intervention in Yemen, though he reluctantly agreed to support the administration’s official line. Similarly, the White House response to both the June 2025 and March 2026 strikes on Iran largely kept Vance out of the spotlight, suggesting his continued tacit opposition to American intervention in the Middle East.
Trump’s approach to Europe, however, more closely follows Vance’s vision. In his 2025 speech at the Munich Security Conference, he characterized support for European security as largely unaligned with American interests. Vance dismissed economic and security threats from China and Russia, instead identifying Europe’s foremost security challenge as ‘the threat from within.’ Vance identified two core ideological departures between the US and Europe: the erosion of freedom of speech and the rise of mass migration. In each case, Vance positioned the direction of European states in contrast to the Trump administration, fraying the ideological fabric of the alliance. Referencing the overturning of the Romanian election in 2024, Vance threatened that if European states perpetuated undemocratic practices, ‘there is nothing America can do for you.’ Vance’s various criticisms contained a thinly veiled threat: if Europe does not align with American interests, the US will withdraw support, irrespective of historical alignments.
Despite a generally reluctant attitude towards international military intervention, Vance has rhetorically reconciled restraint-realism with the hemispheric dominance model of the Trump Corollary. As early as a 2022 interview with Steve Bannon, Vance explained the difference between Ukrainian aid and intervention in Latin America, stating 'I do care about the fact that in my community right now the leading cause of death among 18 to 45 year-olds is Mexican fentanyl that's coming across the southern border.’ Thus, by citing the capture of Nicolas Maduro and the strikes on alleged drug smuggling boats in Latin American waters as necessary to curb the flow of immigrants and drugs, Vance and the nationalist elements of the party fall in line with the administration's narrative. While it is unlikely a Vance presidency would match Trump’s aggressive military actions within the Western Hemisphere, Vance’s opposition to intervention is not absolute; rather, he views coercive force is permissible when directly pertinent to domestic concerns.
While Vance undoubtedly has wide support among the MAGA base, Marco Rubio cultivates popularity among the traditional Republican establishment. Furthermore, his dual positions as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor have created a robust resume for a presidential bid. Rubio is a primacist, focused on actively maintaining the United States’ global dominance through both military intervention and pragmatic as opposed to ideological alliances. Rather than a domestic lens, Rubio instead views foreign policy through the lens of great-power competition with China.
In contrast to Vance’s silence following recent strikes on Iran and Yemen, Rubio has taken a prominent role in articulating the administration’s position. He shares Vance’s criticism of the nation-building and ideological motivations of the Bush era; however, Rubio supports a sustained military presence in the Middle East to promote regional stability. In response to Iranian assertiveness, Rubio has adopted a doctrine of maximum pressure, including heavy sanctions and preemptive strikes aimed at crippling Iran’s nuclear and military capabilities. Rubio has cultivated strategic partnerships with the Gulf monarchies, facilitating a robust network of military and diplomatic infrastructure throughout the region. Ultimately, Rubio’s approach to the Middle East rests on strong, pragmatic alliances, with military force as a tool for maintaining regional stability and American interests.
Rather than leveling scathing criticism, Rubio’s speech at the 2026 Munich Security Conference offered a vision of transatlantic solidarity. He lamented that the US and Europe have strayed from their mutual self-interest, allowing China and Russia to protect and subsidize their economies, while the West outsourced its sovereignty to international institutions, leaving its economies vulnerable. In doing so, the West unwittingly ceded control of its supply chains and its global primacy to these hostile powers. In his speech, Rubio noted that the US and Europe ‘made these mistakes together,’ and now, they must work together to reassert their influence and independence. While not entirely dismissing international institutions, the West was mistaken to ‘place the so-called world order above the vital interests of our people and our nations.’ Rubio instead supports a civilizational model in which the transatlantic alliance, built on shared values and interests, is prioritised over maintaining the rules-based global order.
The hemispheric dominance model adopted by Trump offers the clearest illustration of Rubio’s influence on the administration's strategic direction. As with the Middle East, Rubio advocates a framework of pragmatic alliances in the region, augmented by the credible threat of American intervention. He has been particularly outspoken against the authoritarian regimes of Cuba and Venezuela, which present not only an ideological challenge but also a potential gateway for Chinese influence in the Western Hemisphere. The strikes on alleged drug smuggling boats and the capture of Maduro highlight his willingness to utilise coercive force against regimes unaligned with US interests. Unlike Vance, who views the region exclusively through a domestic lens, Rubio regards the Western Hemisphere as a consequential battleground in a great-power competition, requiring active involvement and bold action.
While Vance and Rubio both reject the liberal-internationalist consensus, each offers a radically different vision of what will replace it. A Vance presidency would likely see American power deployed sparingly and exclusively to serve immediate domestic concerns. Not only would the American presence in volatile regions decrease, but allies would be encouraged to shoulder more of their own security burdens. Rubio, by contrast, would likely prioritise pragmatic alliances across ideological lines, aiming to curb Chinese influence globally. Whoever secures Trump’s endorsement for 2028 will ultimately decide whether the Republican Party dramatically pivots away from its global commitments or withholds a reformed version of its mantle of global leadership.
Image courtesy of Daniel Torok via Wikimedia Commons, ©2026. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
