Oct 31

Oct 31 Far-Right Opportunism: Spanish Far Right Party Vox turns the Ceuta Migrant Crisis into a Political Weapon

In the aftermath of the Ceuta migrant crisis, two sharply opposing narratives have emerged. On 23 September 2026, Prime Minister Pedró Sánchez told the United Nations General Assembly in New York, that Spain would not be tempted ‘to give in to fear, to turn migrants into the enemy’.Back on Spanish territory, Santiago Abascal, leader of the Spanish Far-right party Vox, organised anti-migration protests under the slogan ‘No to the invasion, Defend Ceuta. Defend Spain’. Vox’s rhetoric is neither a neutral reading of the crisis nor an inevitable response to it. It is constructed through the securitization of migrants, a process in which migrants are portrayed as an existential threat to a nation’s socio-economic stability and the safety of its citizens. By promoting this discourse, Vox mobilises public opinion against Sánchez’ lenient border policies, in favour of strict right policies of deportation and repatriation. The contrast captures how the Ceuta crisis has become a polarised debate within Spanish politics.

The Crisis

On 30 July 2026, Ceuta, the Spanish enclave on the Moroccan coast, witnessed its largest single-day crossing of at least 72,000 migrants into the Spanish territory. The scale of the event provoked uproar regarding the security of Spain’s frontier, despite most migrants almost immediately returning with around 5,000 remaining in camps, on the city’s streets, or on the beach.

Taking to the social media platform X almost immediately, Abascal referred to the event as an ‘INVASIÓN’ (invasion), branding Sánchez as a corrupt and tyrannical leader who’s lenient ‘open border’ migration policies and cooperative ‘friendship’ with Morocco allowed this to happen. That framing set the tone for Vox’s response to the crisis, using it to platform and amplify anti-migration headlines, endorse civil unrest through organised protests, whilst repeatedly insisting that the current Left Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) government is ill-equipped to resolve the situation. This strategy culminated on 9 September, when Abascal confronted Sánchez at the Spanish Congress of Deputies, calling him a ‘traidor’ (traitor) before the national cameras. Abascal’s social media reflects an identical strategy, with his X account being dominated by anti-immigration narratives. From clips of his own speeches portraying the Spanish people as victims of migration, to footage from far-right nationalist protests showing the population mobilising against it, the visual media intended to invoke emotive responses from the Spanish public, encouraging them to stand up for their national community that is under siege and in need of defending. It is apparent that the events in Ceuta have provided Vox with a tangible event to connect their anti-immigration narrative to the fears and insecurities of Spaniards.

Politics on the Street

Over two months since the crisis, the topic continues to dominate Spanish media. Vox and other opposition parties continue to demand accountability and demonstrate solidarity and concern for Ceuta, with Vox calling for public demonstrations against the governmental handling of the crisis on Ceuta’s Independence Day, 2 September. These demonstrations have taken place in Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia and other cities across Spain, with 50,000 people in Madrid and 200,000 people in the Málaga province, taking to the streets endorsing Vox’s hardline approach to migration. Abascal personally attended one of the national rallies in support of Ceuta, stating that Ceuta was only the beginning and that this crisis is a preview of what will happen to Spain if migration goes unchallenged.

Vox’s Strategy

Founded in 2013, Vox is a far-right party defined by opposition to immigration and its emphasis on Spanish national unity. In July 2025, a year prior to the crisis, party spokesmen called for a mass deportation of any migrants who failed to integrate into Spanish society. It is therefore unsurprising that Vox seized the opportunity of Ceuta. The policies and anti-immigration stance were already in place thus the crisis offered a vivid, publicised, emotionally charged event through which to connect migrants to Spaniards’ anxieties. In doing so, analysts detect a pattern of Vox following a familiar far-right playbook of scapegoating, attributing the broad socio-economic insecurities of Spaniards as being caused by a single group, in this case migrants. One article published in Madrid on 7 September synthesises this stating that there is ‘a longstanding strategy of channelling and stroking discontent over illegal immigration’ from right political parties.

Public Opinion

Polling data suggests that the strategy is finding an audience. According to a study conducted by the 40dB research organisation in Spain, 63 percent of Spaniards agreed that Sanchez and his government had performed ‘badly’ or ‘very badly’ in relation to the crisis. Even more informative is the data that 27 percent of Spaniards believed that Vox and Abascal were better equipped to handle migration issues, in comparison to Sánchez with only 18.4 percent. What is more pressing is how current election survey data from Data10, carried out on 26 and 27 August, indicates that the crisis has begun to shift public political opinions. Despite the data displaying that Vox has risen minutely from 17.8 percent in July 2026 to 18 percent in August, this shift marks the beginning of a broader trend of far-right parties gaining traction as a response to Spaniard’s fear of immigration. As stated in an article released by Demócrata, this could consolidate Vox and Abascal within the far-right bloc as a future ‘essential partner’ of Populist Party (PP), a fellow right party, offering the potential for a majority coalition government. Reflecting on public sentiment, journalist Catherine Mills shows the polarity within Spain. Whilst right-leaning observes commend Abascal for his vocalised discontent and opposition to Sánchez, under the pretence of supposedly holding him accountable, Left-leaning commentators contend that Abascal’s narrative is ‘dangerously inflammatory and designed to exploit human suffering for electoral gain’.

It is undeniable that this crisis has and will continue to affect Spanish Politics, leaving a legacy of anti-migration rhetoric, scepticism regarding the competence of Sanchez in dealing with such matters, and polarisation within society regarding how to broach migration policies. Thus, the crisis will remain a ‘major political headache’ for Sánchez in the coming months and as analysts have commented, the crisis has ‘played perfectly into its [Vox’] hands’. It is very likely that the far-right anti-migration parties will continue to profit off the genuine concern of Spaniards that migration will exacerbate insecurities. Therefore, the crisis could jeopardise the 2027 elections as faith and trust in Sánchez declines. Even during researching and writing this report, the situation in Spain has worsened, with Sánchez calling an early election in response to the country’s current housing crisis. However, with the dissatisfaction from the Spanish public towards Sánchez amidst the ongoing Ceuta crisis, the outcome of said election is dubious.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.