The Gold Standard: The Counter Terrorism Service and the Future of Iraq’s Military

December 9th, 2021 marked the fourth anniversary of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s final military defeat. At a time where Iraq is gripped by a wave of political and sectarian tensions, culminating in a drone attack on Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi's residence in November, the occasion also marked a symbolic milestone for al-Kadhimi's government – the official end of the international coalitions’ combat operations and a transition into an “advise, assist, and enable” role. The announcement was met with scepticism by local and international observers, with many pointing out the increasingly fragile state of the country’s security forces; indeed, the Lead Inspector General report on Operation Inherent Resolve, the US-led military effort against ISIS, highlighted a number of shortcomings in the Iraqi armed forces’ ability to operate independently. These included endemic corruption, poor tactical command-and-control, and mistrust within the security forces. In effect, the national government has been forced to simultaneously confront pressure from the anti-coalition Popular Mobilization Forces, who decry continued foreign involvement in Iraq as a “renewed occupation,” and an increasingly vulnerable security apparatus reliant on foreign assistance. Fortunately, a local solution exists and resides in one of the smallest, albeit most effective, components of the Iraqi defence establishment. 

In December of 2003, the United States’ Central Command, the geographic command responsible for the Middle East, directed the development of an Iraqi counter-terrorism unit. Volunteers were drawn from Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish populations and underwent a rigorous three-week selection process followed by a 98-day training course in Jordan. This first batch of 100 soldiers served as the nucleus for the new Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force, an all-volunteer, cross-sectarian unit that carried out an “industrial-scale” campaign of counterterrorism alongside its coalition partners. The ICTF, which has since expanded with two additional brigades to form the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, is a unique force in Iraq. Its ethnic diversity shielded it from militia infiltrations which plagued conventional army units while its compact size allowed it to retain exceptionally high standards of selection and training, a process facilitated by continued US mentoring through the State Department after the American withdrawal in 2011. When ISIS launched its 2014 offensive into the province of Nineveh, one third of the Iraqi brigades tasked with its defence collapsed. The ICTS, however, held and spearheaded relentless campaigns of urban fighting to retake Ramadi, Tikrit, and Mosul. Today, the service is popularly referred to as the “Golden Division” and, alongside the paramilitary Popular Mobilization Forces, is one of two military units to have retained the full trust of the Iraqi people throughout the seven-year fight against ISIS. The ICTS’ success against ISIS came at a steep cost, with the unit suffering casualty rates of forty percent; the experience gained, however, allowed the ICTS to transform from a small raiding force into an increasingly self-sustaining organization capable of both counterterrorism strikes and large-scale military operations. In this sense, the ICTS is uniquely positioned to provide a local solution to elevate the standards and capabilities of the Iraqi military.  

This new mission is a daunting one, but one need only look to recent history to see the impact a single professional unit can have on an entire branch of the armed forces. Much like today’s Iraqi Army, for instance, the United States military was a depleted organization following the Vietnam War. Experienced personnel had left, drug use was rampant, and professional standards had slipped within the entire force. This, combined with concerns over the Army’s ability to respond to growing tensions in the Middle East after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, prompted Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams to resurrect the World War II idea of a highly mobile, specially selected “Ranger” battalion. Abrams envisioned the battalion as the world’s premier light infantry force, a unit that could “do things with its hands and weapons better than anyone” and issued the following directive: “wherever the battalion goes, it must be apparent that it is the best”. Today, Abram’s Ranger battalion has grown into a regimental formation and, much like the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service, developed a dual capability of short-term counterterrorism raids and large-scale offensive operations. The Ranger Regiment has also evolved into the army’s standard-bearer organization, responsible for doctrinal advancements ranging from field-expedient blood transfusions to the modern task-conditions-standards approach to training. Crucial to this is the constant cycling of experienced Rangers into the wider operational force, allowing experienced commissioned and non-commissioned officers to imbue their new units with “the [Ranger] Regiment’s dauntless spirit and high standards.”  

The Ranger Regiment’s “standard-bearer” role did not develop overnight, and neither will the ICTS; however, the Golden Division possesses key advantages that can be exploited to improve the entire Iraqi Army. Its wealth of experience in major combined-arms operations against ISIS can be leveraged to improve the military’s wider operational planning ability. The service’s multi-sectarianism would also play a crucial role in bridging the gaps between the disparate, and often conflicting, ethnic interests within the Iraqi security apparatus. Most of all, the Golden Division’s discipline and esprit de corps could be diffused into the broader military as senior members are rotated out of the ICTS and into leadership roles in other units. Legitimacy is the lifeblood of any armed force, and, if the Iraqi military is to be the public’s force of choice in future conflicts, it is imperative that it possess the professionalism and discipline of an organization capable of ensuring their security without an overreliance on foreign assistance. Corruption, command-and-control difficulties, and internal mistrust are systemic issues that cannot be fully addressed with simple solutions; however, the infusion of the ICTS’ experience and talent into the Iraqi security apparatus marks the first step in addressing these challenges. Allowing the ICTS to, instead, turn inwards and return to its narrow counter-terrorism mandate following ISIS’ military defeat would be to forgo an indispensable source of local expertise and legitimacy at a time when both are in short supply.  

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team. 

Image courtesy of Anthony Zendejas IV via WikiCommons, ©2022, some rights reserved.