What Is To Be Done?: The Situation in the Middle East
The recent Israeli attack on Qatar in early September angered Arab leaders and heightened security concerns across the Middle East. In response, the United States issued a sharp reprimand towards the Israeli government – a move that may have prompted regret within Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s administration and appeared aimed at tentatively easing tensions with Doha. Shortly after, President Donald Trump signed an executive order guaranteeing Qatari security, signaling renewed US engagement in Gulf affairs. Together, these developments suggest that states in the Middle East may be approaching a turning point in its political and security alignments.
With numerous Arab states reaffirming their solidarity with Qatar following last month’s attack and openly condemning Israeli actions, even calling for Israel to be held accountable for what Doha termed ‘war crimes and acts of aggression,’ Qatar’s previous position as an optimistic arbitrator of regional peace appears compromised. While Doha sought to enact a ceasefire and bring an end to the continuing Israeli military campaign in the Palestinian territories, its intent to restore regional stability remains intact. Yet, the state may find itself in a more precarious diplomatic position than before.
Israeli assertiveness has increasingly drawn the attention of the international community. The recent seizure of 42 boats that were part of the Gaza humanitarian flotilla – an attempt to break Israel’s 16-year maritime blockade – provoked widespread ire and protests worldwide. The strong international reaction to the interception, including criticism from activists like Greta Thunberg, who described the mission as abiding by international humanitarian law, reflects a growing awareness and collective solidarity with the plight of Palestinians. It also demonstrates that a peaceful resolution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, although facing obstacles in its implementation, is far from forgotten. This suggests a welcome change in the paradigms governing interstate relations in the Middle East.
The dangers of Israeli aggression raise an important question: should Arab states broaden the scope of the alliances they forge? Despite prior attempts at normalisation with Israel - most recently by the new Syrian government - likely justified as a means to guarantee territorial sovereignty, reduce regional antagonism and perhaps appeal to the US, Israel now faces growing isolation. Neighbouring states are increasingly frustrated by the security risk the country poses to their interests.
Yet where would Arab states turn? China, Russia, North Korea and Iran have recently sought to build what some analysts have termed an ‘axis of upheaval,’ aiming to reshape the global order and provide an alternative to the US-led Western world order. The Middle East, however, may be best served by maintaining strategic autonomy rather than directly opposing the US or subscribing to the world order envisioned by China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. Numerous members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) aim to position themselves as reliable financial hubs and key partners for international actors, from states to international corporations, seeking economic opportunities. With such ambitions, Arab states would be wise to avoid binding themselves to any single geopolitical order. Doing so could risk antagonising partners in the European Union, India and the US, who remain close allies to many Arab governments. By rejecting the US-led order outright, states in the Middle East may forfeit the flexibility needed to develop diverse multilateral ties and sustain economic development.
Interestingly, it appears that while multiple Arab states may have previously sought warmer relations with Israel to counterbalance Tehran, Iran appears to be shifting focus. Post-revolutionary Iran has historically aimed to place itself in direct opposition to what it perceives as unchecked Israeli aggression through its ‘axis of resistance.’ Recently, however, Tehran has turned inwards, focusing on its worsening domestic water crisis linked to Tehran’s rapid urban expansion. The Iranian president has even suggested moving Iran’s capital elsewhere as a means to combat the crisis and overcome the constraint on resources the state is currently facing. This more inward-looking Iran is a far cry from the state that had engaged in cross-border missile exchanges with Israel last year. It illustrates how the climate crisis and the unsustainable consumption of resources are increasingly shifting Iran’s interests away from projecting an image of strength onto the world stage, towards domestic preservation.
With that being said, what would the best course of action be? It is always difficult to outline specifics and speculate in politics. It nevertheless appears that Arab states would be well-advised to develop stronger ties both within and beyond the region, while avoiding over-reliance on any external power. The temptation to form rigid blocs remains strong amid growing uncertainty. However, states in the Middle East appear to have successfully chosen to view politics as more than just a ‘zero-sum game,’ and instead, a positive-sum gain. The United Arab Emirates and others have actively pursued wide-ranging multilateral partnerships for economic, technological, and security purposes, ensuring mutual benefit across alliances. Although uncertainty may threaten this balance, it remains the most pragmatic path forward.
For decades, the Middle East has been viewed by outsiders as a region defined by instability and discord. Yet this current moment of uncertainty may offer a unique opportunity for states in the region to reshuffle and cement their foreign policy orientations, creating a more cohesive, internationally-engaged region capable of achieving its varied ambitions.
