South Sudan; the Cycle of Violence Continues by Nicholas Silveira de Carvalho
South Sudan's road to independence started during the First Sudanese Civil War in the fifties. South Sudan initially fought because of the divides between the predominantly Christian south and the predominantly Muslim north. This long and bloody road led South Sudan to a second civil war from 1983 to 2005. The leading rebel group that fought in the Second Sudanese Civil War was the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), with the main political wing being the Sudan People’s Liberation Party (SPLM). The prominent leader who kept the SPLM/A together and united its multiple ethnicities was John Garang. Garang envisioned a multi-ethnic South Sudan where all ethnicities were equal. After securing a peace treaty in 2005 that paved the way for southern Sudanese independence, Garang died. His successor was Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka.
The 2005 peace treaty was between Sudan and the SPLA. Before this, the SPLA was purely a military organization fighting for Southern Sudanese interests. According to Alex de Waal, the SPLA is “a collection of militia, each of which was organized on the basis of personal loyalty to its commander.” The SPLA never held elections, wrote a constitution, or engaged in civil affairs before 2005; thus, the leading organization in the state formation of South Sudan was a military group composed of opportunistic generals and soldiers loyal to their local commanders. These opportunistic commanders made up the initial Southern Sudanese government.
Independence in 2011 promised an end to the near-constant violence since the closure of the colonial era. Fourteen years on, violence has simply continued in the form of tribalism. In the early days of independence, President Kiir used government funds (98% of which came from oil) to buy loyalty. When, after six months of independence, South Sudan shut down their oil production, what kept the former commanders loyal to the government dissipated.
In 2013, President Kiir removed Vice President Riek Machar and other Nuer ministers from office, starting the violence that would characterize the sovereign state of South Sudan. President Kiir claimed that Machar and others were planning a coup. In retaliation, they formed a splinter group within the SPLM, called SPLM-IO (SPLM-in-Opposition). Thus, the Southern Sudanese Civil War began between the predominantly Dinka and Salva Kiir-led SPLM government and the predominantly Nuer Riek Machar-led SPLM-IO. Machar was a former SPLA general, and now Kiir cannot buy the loyalty of Nuer politicians; the government has broken apart. The break along ethnic lines also added the ethnic dimension that has defined the conflict to this day.
The Southern Sudanese Civil War was a bloody affair, resulting by 2018 in more than a million refugees leaving South Sudan, 3.9 million internally displaced people, and 400,000 killed, with reported cases of ethnic cleansing and sexual violence.
Throughout the conflict, many outside mediators sought to bring about peace. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) brokered a peace agreement in 2015, but within a couple of months, it collapsed amid intensifying fighting. In 2018, Uganda (which has supported Kiir throughout the conflict, even using the Ugandan air force to bomb rebel groups against the Kiir government) and Sudan mediated the R-ARCSS agreement between SPLM and SPLM-IO. The peace deal outlined a power-sharing system between the two groups, with Riek Machar reappointed as vice president. However, not every rebel group was a signatory to this agreement. The National Salvation Front (NAS), led by a rebel breakaway general, was one prominent group that continued fighting in Equatoria State, South Sudan.
Although not all belligerents signed the agreement, the two largest factions did and returned to the capital, Juba. Violence subsided, raising hopes for lasting peace. But did everyone eventually reconcile? Sadly, no.
Worryingly, violence erupted again in South Sudan this year. An unstructured Nuer militia, the White Army, that sided with SPLM-IO previously during the civil war, seized control of a Southern Sudanese (SSPDF) military base, resulting in the deaths of 28 SSPDF soldiers and a UN peacekeeper.
President Kiir has responded by arresting multiple members of SPLM-IO, including putting Riek Machar under house arrest, violating the 2018 peace agreement. Kiir has followed this up by indicting Machar and 20 other SPLM-IO members with treason, murder, and crimes against humanity. The controversial trials started in September of this year.
Machar has denied all charges, claiming the accusations are “politically motivated.” The SPLM-IO has called the trial of Machar a “political witch-hunt” that threatens the 2018 peace accord. Indeed, violence has further intensified with the political prosecution of Machar. SPLM-IO forces started clashing with government forces in March, risking a return to the bloodshed that defined the conflict from 2013-18. Additionally, Uganda has sent troops to support government forces.
With the peace treaty now at risk, there could be a resumption of violence and a heightening of the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan. Many refugees are already coming into South Sudan, fleeing from the Sudanese Civil War, stretching resources.
Third parties may step in again to mediate the conflict. The African Union, back in March, deployed the ‘Panel of the Wise’ to mediate the violence, but that deployment has now become more critical as the violence intensified. Kenya also spearheaded the Tumaini Peace Initiative in 2024, bringing together Southern Sudanese political leaders to discuss ways to reduce violence. The initiative stalled when SPLM-IO withdrew over concerns about the mandate. Kenya could revive the Tumaini Initiative. Uganda, which mediated the 2018 deal alongside the now-deposed Sudanese leader, Omar al-Bashir, could mediate an agreement, but that seems unlikely, as Ugandan troops deployed in Juba seem to legitimize the 2018 treaty violation committed by Kiir’s government.
Regardless, Kiir has consistently ignored mediation efforts since the March escalation. Yet his grip on power may not last long. He is already 74 years old and appears to be preparing his successor. What follows in the months to come may decide the fate of millions of people. South Sudan might very well repeat the cycle of violence that started in 2013, with Nuer and SPLM-IO factions rising in arms and fervor against the government prosecuting their leader. The Kiir government might continue its war against non-Dinka communities. Kiir’s succession further complicates the picture. Could a ‘peaceful’ transition of power be successfully executed, and would it be executed just to continue the violence against SPLM-IO and other groups? Or will the succession leave a power vacuum within the government and the SPLM, resulting in further violence?
I do not pretend to know where the conflict will go in a year, but I remain skeptical that things will turn out well. If there is anything to take away from South Sudan's history, it is that the cycle of violence that started back during the first Sudanese Civil War is hard to stop. South Sudan was born after decades of bloodshed, and barely two years after independence, the country returned to bloodshed. Corrupt generals established the country, who know only one way to get what they want: war. Furthermore, the conflict between groups defined by ethnic affiliation has worsened inter-ethnic relations, harming state cohesion. Unless profound and significant political and institutional changes happen within the South Sudanese government, the country may well be doomed to another bloody chapter in its history.
All we can do now from St Andrews is to study where South Sudan keeps on failing to establish lasting peace, and hope that the political leaders of South Sudan keep Thich Nhat Hanh’s metaphor in mind, when you only water the seed of violence, only violence grows.
Image courtesy of Jason Patinkin via Wikimedia, ©2016. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
