Saudi Arabian and Iranian Realignment under Chinese Mediation: What Comes Next?
At 13:11 GMT on March 10th, 2023, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s English-language Twitter account for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) released a tweet that caught viewers worldwide off guard. The tweet was a “Joint Trilateral Statement by the Kingdom of #Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of #Iran, and the People’s Republic of #China” from the Saudi M.O.F.A. English-language section, announcing the resumption of Saudi Arabian-Iranian diplomatic relations, after a conference in Beijing mediated by the premier Chinese diplomat Wang Yi. At this meeting, representatives from Tehran and Riyadh agreed to resume a security pact originally signed in 2001, which, according to Arab News, aimed to “combat terrorism, drug smuggling and money laundering.” The reestablishment of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran under the leadership of China, a global power that seems determined to upend the current United States-led liberal world order, paints a shadow over this diplomatic realignment whilst potentially inflaming existing turbulent relations with Russia.
One reason that this announcement was unexpected was due to the turbulent and violent fracturing of Iranian-Saudi Arabian relations back in 2016. Although there had been a long proxy war between the Shia-majority Iran and Sunni-majority Saudi Arabia, nothing had yet erupted that would rupture relations before 2016. That all changed on the morning of January 2nd, 2016, when the prominent Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, along with 47 others, was beheaded on charges of terrorism and sedition, reported the Associated Press. Sheikh al-Nimr and the others had been accused of fermenting extremism against the Saudi state, in association with other Sunni radicals and al-Qaeda. This execution touched off dozens of incidents in protest, most prominently the storming and subsequent arson attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran. As reported by the British Broadcasting Corporation, the attack, in which protestors “ransacked…and set alight” the embassy, resulted in Saudi Arabia immediately cutting off “all commercial and air traffic links” and diplomatic relations with Iran. Iran in return severed relations and shut down all embassies, consulates, and other diplomatic outreaches in or related to Saudi Arabia. That series of violent events seemed to put a definitive end to any possible Iran-Saudi Arabia diplomatic relations, as far as anyone could predict, until now.
This conference, and subsequent diplomatic realignment in one of the most volatile and oil-rich regions in the world, is one of the most recent signs that China has been expanding its influence in the Middle East, as well as the rest of the world. One potential reason for China cultivating relationships in the Middle East is to for oil production and access. China is currently one of the largest importers of oil, crude or otherwise, in the world. Reuters reports that specifically,
“China's crude imports may rise between 500,000 and 1 million barrels per day (bpd) this year to as high as 11.8 million bpd, reversing previous two years' decline to exceed 2020's record of 10.8 million bpd, according to analysts from four industry consultancies” (Wood Mackenzie, FGE, Energy Aspects and S&P Global Commodity Insight)."
Considering the considerable oil output of Saudi Arabia and Iran, China could view this as an opportunity to reduce its reliance on Russian oil, as Russia has become a particularly unreliable and volatile partner on the international stage.
Despite severe sanctions, Russia still maintains a very significant oil output. The S&P Global estimates that Russian oil exports “rose 2% [from] 535.2 million mt in 2022, equivalent to around 10.75 mil b/d” by exploiting new and eager markets, particularly in China, India and Turkey. Without any fresh action, S&P “forecasts a recovery in Russian output of around 250,000 b/d by October if there are no more prohibitive price caps or new Western sanctions.” This would, at first glance, seem like an extremely profitable partnership for China. China would be able to receive a great deal of Russian oil at extremely low costs, as the price of Russian oil has tumbled due to the sanctions.
China may have been further put off from a partnership with Russia after Vladimir Putin warned that he was prepared to use his nuclear arsenal. Chinese representative to the United Nations Geng Shuang described Russia’s repositioning of nuclear weapons in Belarus as a major escalation and risk for a wider war, stressing that nuclear weapons as a whole to a “sword of Damocles hanging over” the collective heads of the world. Additionally, events in recent days have only weakened Russia’s position in Ukraine, internally and on the battlefield. The drone attack in Moscow, described by the Kremlin as an attempt on Putin’s life; Yevgeny Prigozhin’s declaration that Wagner troops will withdraw from Bakhmut on 10 May, where “Wagner troops have been heavily involved” and indeed constituted a majority of Russian troops assaulting the embattled Ukrainian forces; and the unconfirmed reports that Ukraine may have intercepted Russia’s vaunted hypersonic missile with a U.S.-provided anti-ballistic missile defence system, may serve to destabilise Russia’s internal stability. If the reports of a missile intercept are true, Russia may feel that a nuclear response is warranted before Ukraine’s spring counteroffensive begins. This is a scenario Xi Jinping fears greatly and would prefer to avoid. Therefore, the instability of Russia, at the highest and lowest rungs of command, serves to make Iran and Saudi Arabia more attractive partners for Chinese oil acquisition. Saudi Arabia, at least, won’t launch a surprise military incursion into Qatar, and Iran won’t publicly launch a nuclear weapon at Israel without Chinese cooperation if China expands their economic ties, and will further China’s strategic competition with the United States.
In short, the diplomatic realignment of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia under the mediation of China is rather unexpected for a number of reasons, particularly when considering the reason in 2016 relations were severed, and hold dark implications for the future. This is possibly a future where China secures oil from the Saudi Arabia and Iran while lessening dependence on an increasingly unstable Russian Federation. Chinese cooperation with Iran and Saudi Arabia also gives the possibility that Iran could modernise its ageing aircraft fleet and overall military capabilities, and would serve to wane U.S. influence in the region in future years.
Image courtesy of Mehr News Agency via Wikimedia, ©2023, some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
