Putin the Deathless and Ivan Tzarevich: Russia’s Succession Dilemmas
The tale of Koschei the Deathless is one of the most famous in Russian folklore. Koschei is an undead sorcerer who lives forever through dark magic. In some tales, Koschei hides his soul in a chest on a mystical island; in others, it is impossibly hidden in a needle inside an egg inside a duck. But in all the tales, Koschei the Deathless is defined by his lust for power and obsession with immortality. After this September’s hot mic comments from Vladimir Putin, this fairy tale has seemed more real.
China’s military parade in Beijing on 3 September was attended by authoritarian leaders from around the world, including Russian President Vladimir Putin. China and Russia appeared to enter a new stage of their “no limits” partnership. At the summit, a live mic caught Putin and Xi Jinping discussing the possibility of prolonged lifespans. Putin was heard saying, “Human organs can be continuously transplanted. The longer you live, the younger you become, and [can] even achieve immortality.” Putin’s delusional musings are no mere thought experiment. They reveal deep into his psyche and possible succession plans (or lack thereof). True to his aspiration, Russia’s state science foundation recently announced increased funding for anti-aging and life extension research. Putin really does want to live forever, but just like Koschei’s final defeat in Russian folklore, Putin will die eventually.
The question of succession in Russia or the possible removal of Putin from power has puzzled analysts for years. Contrary to the rampant speculations of generational turnover in Russia, Putin’s “overreach” in Ukraine, or the Russian economy’s imminent collapse, Putin’s grip on power has never been more solid in all his twenty-five-year reign. In June 2023, Putin faced his most severe challenge yet with the rebellion of the Wagner Group commander, Yevgeny Prigozhin. One assessment of Prigozhin’s short-lived rebellion is that the Russian public’s lack of support for Putin was indicative of cracks in Putin’s regime, but the swiftness with which Putin dealt with Prigozhin suggests otherwise. In one day, Putin succeeded in dissuading Prigozhin in a series of phone calls with Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko. Two months later, Prigozhin and his two closest associates in the Wagner Group were killed in a plane crash orchestrated by Putin. In an interview, Prigozhin’s mother revealed that she had tried to dissuade her son, saying that he overestimated the extent of his support. She warned him, “Only people on the internet will support you. No one will go with you.” At this point in his reign, Putin is most likely to remain President of Russia until his natural death.
Who, then, would Putin wish to succeed him? In September 2024, a new development emerged. A report from the Dossier Center, a Russian anti-regime investigative group, revealed the existence of Putin’s sons. Putin shares two sons with Russian Olympic gymnast Alina Kabaeva: Ivan, 10, and Vladimir Jr., 6. The boys live in isolation in a mansion on Lake Valdai, north-west of Moscow, surrounded by nannies, tutors, and FSO security officers. They vacation in Sochi and Crimea and are shuttled around with several armored trains, yachts, and private jets. When his elder son, Ivan, was born in Lugano, Switzerland, in 2015, the Russian dictator was reportedly so glad that he shouted, “Hurray! Finally! A boy!”
Historically, the Western foreign policy community has disregarded the possibility of hereditary succession in Russia, instead speculating about the ascendency of younger oligarchs, a democratic transition, or even the implosion of the Russian Federation. Hereditary succession has been overlooked in part because Putin has had only daughters. Putin has two daughters by his ex-wife, Lyudmila Shkrebneva: Maria Voronstova, 40, and Katrina Tikhonova, 39, and another daughter from an affair with a cleaner-turned-billionaire. Putin’s elder daughters also have families of their own. Putin rarely acknowledges their existence. However, in a 2017 interview, when referring to his grandchildren, Putin said that they live normal lives. He stated, “the thing is, I don’t want them to grow up like hereditary princes, I want them to grow up to be normal people.” His family with Alina Kabaeva may be another case entirely.
According to the Dossier Center report, Putin’s sons receive extensive education and athletic training. They are learning English and German (their father, a former KGB officer in East Germany, is a fluent German speaker) and possibly Mandarin as well. They receive private sports lessons from Olympic athletes, in addition to music and chess lessons. All this suggests that they are being groomed for a different life than that of their half-sisters’ children. As the report details, “none of [the staff] risk arguing with the children, so the boys are growing up believing they are exceptional.” The Dossier Center even entitled its report “Succession.”
Many more developments would need to happen before any speculation could be confirmed. But the possibility that Putin may attempt to install his sons as possible successors should not be dismissed out of hand. Furthermore, some of Putin’s allies have appointed surprisingly young heirs. South Korean intelligence now believes that Kim Jong Un’s preteen daughter is his most likely successor. She accompanied her father to the Beijing military parade in September and has appeared numerous times on North Korean state media. Closer to home, Chechen strongman Ramzan Kadyrov has fast-tracked the succession of his seventeen-year-old son, Adam Kadyrov. Despite his age, the younger Kadyrov was married this year and has already served as head of his father’s security service and head of Chechnya’s police force. Kadyrov, 49, was diagnosed with pancreatic necrosis in 2019 and likely plans to carry out a smooth succession upon his passing. If Putin wishes to imitate them, he will have a much harder time. Both Chechnya and North Korea have a history of hereditary succession. Most of Putin’s inner circle are in their seventies. Putin would need to ensure their loyalty while also promoting a younger vanguard loyalty to him. He would also need to live long enough for his sons to be old enough and experienced enough to assume power. Putin is 73, still relatively young by world leader standards. In another fifteen years (an amount of time hard for Western analysts to comprehend given the short span of election cycles), Putin would be 88, and his elder son, Ivan, would be 25.
To make sense of the dilemmas of succession in Russia, observers should closely monitor developments in both the Kremlin and Putin’s private life. In the years to come, more information will emerge. Even if Putin does appoint a successor, what happens after Putin’s death is anyone’s guess. What we do know, based on Putin’s musings on immortality and the Dossier Center revelations, is that he is playing the long game. Putin is in no rush to end the war in Ukraine. While he has no intention of détente with the West, he is cautious when choosing to escalate, knowing that whatever conflict he creates, he cannot undo. The Kremlin’s hybrid warfare campaign and media war are designed to wear down Western resolve over time. Putin is paranoid, but not yet self-destructive. While civil society and liberties in the Russian Federation have been crushed, he does not wish to push Russian society toward the brink of collapse.
In the coming years, the tale of Putin the Deathless and Ivan Tzarevich will unfold. What sort of tale it will be, only time will tell.
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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
