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Is the Coup in Myanmar Bad News for China?

Is the Coup in Myanmar Bad News for China?

On February 1st, 2021, Myanmar’s powerful military overthrew the democratically elected government in a coup d’état. Citizens have gathered in large groups to protest the military through civil disobedience and strikes, and the military’s response has grown more forceful as the weeks have gone by with more than 60 deaths and hundreds of injuries. On February 22nd, a general strike was held when millions of people participated in a national boycott that paralyzed the banking system. 

The idea of a coup emerged when the National League for Democracy (NLD), the leading political party in Myanmar led by Aung San Suu Kyi, won 396 out of 476 parliamentary seats in the November 8, 2020 elections while the military’s party won only 33 seats. The military did not accept the results and accused the elections of being fraudulent, leading military forces to surround the houses of parliament with soldiers. The military detained Aung San Suu Kyi as well as many other civilian officials and announced that a state of emergency would be in effect for one year. Military leaders cited the 2008 constitution which outlines the military’s ability to declare a national emergency. 

Suu Kyi became the primary democratic icon in Myanmar after the student uprising in 1988 and won the Nobel Peace prize in 1991. She advocated for democracy during her 15-year house arrest and succeeded in bringing her party the National League for Democracy to parliament. Suu Kyi secured a victory in the 2016 general election, the country’s first free and fair election in decades. The road to democracy has not been an easy one, however. In 2017 U Ko Ni, an ally of Suu Kyi’s and a prominent lawyer, was shot outside an airport in a plot involving former military officials. Later that year the military authorized the ‘clearance’ of Rohingya Muslims who were accused of launching attacks on military posts. It soon became apparent that these operations were a clear example of ethnic cleansing. The man who led those attacks is the military commander in chief Main Aung Hlaing, now the head of the State Administrative Council, the military-led government that came to power since the coup. 

Suu Kyi and the deposed president Mr. Win Myint now stand trial for ambiguous charges such as breaking import regulations and violating natural disaster restrictions. Suu Kyi was not given proper legal representation and it is expected the trial could last up to a year. The trial is widely believed to be a ploy for keeping the former civilian leader under arrest. It is unclear why the military felt the need to oust Suu Kyi when she has actively supported the military and given them significant freedom to act as they wish, even defending the ethnic cleansing in 2017 to the UN International Court of Justice. It may be that democracy in Myanmar is not attainable with such a powerful military and that the freedoms and liberties that have been achieved were not meant to last. 

On March 2nd, the UN Security Council met in order to release a joint statement on the Coup, but China used its veto power and blocked the initiative. China’s block reflects its pattern of protecting Myanmar from international scrutiny and sanctions. China has continuously defended Myanmar against criticism over the aggressive crackdown against Rohingya Muslims. China has enjoyed beneficial relations with Myanmar’s junta government for decades and has been Myanmar’s largest ally while Western governments commonly impose sanctions and restrictions. When the previously isolated country began opening up a decade ago, China’s diplomatic and economic monopoly somewhat faded. 

One may surmise that China ‘loses’ when neighboring countries turn to democracy and ‘wins’ when they convert to authoritarianism, but China and Myanmar’s relations go deeper than that. When Suu Kyi began gaining popularity, China responded by developing diplomatic ties with the NLD and formed a tentative partnership. However, the military, especially commander in chief Min Aung Hlaing, widely distrusts China and believes Beijing is responsible for much of the internal conflict within Myanmar. Myanmar’s dependence on China due to aggressive Western sanctions has always deeply concerned the military generals and prompted attempts to liberalize the Myanmar economy in the 1990s. The military’s animosity is not China’s only problem, however. Under Suu Kyi’s government, China enjoyed good press as well as economic advantages, but this seems to have gone to waste under the coup. The people of Myanmar are unimpressed with China and protestors criticize Beijing for not condemning the coup and recognizing Suu Kyi’s government as the only legitimate political body. Rumors have spread that China is responsible for engineering the coup and that Chinese military officials have been spotted among security forces. 


There are many advantages and disadvantages of the coup for China, but a major element of concern for Beijing is that Myanmar’s instability is bad news for China’s Belt and Road Initiative that aims to facilitate economic relations between China and Eurasia. An isolated Myanmar under the new junta government means the connectivity China has been seeking is at risk. In the past decade, China has worked to launch several developmental initiatives approved by the now-ousted NLD government such as the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, which links China to the Bay of Bengal. Now China must hope that those projects continue under the new junta government, or else it will be forced to forge a new relationship with the unfriendly military generals. 

The international response to the coup reflects the constant competition between China and the US to exert the most diplomatic and political influence. China has sought to make its neighbor a pliant business partner while the US continues to encourage Myanmar to pursue a democratic transition. US President Biden has promised to support the restoration of the democratic government and punish those who are responsible for the coup, but the US might not be the major moral influence it was in the past. Myanmar is less isolated than it once was, with Japan, Singapore, and South Korea investinglarge sums of money in the country. Further, links with other Asian countries means China is not Myanmar’s only alternative to Western support like it was during Myanmar’s years of isolation. 

China has done little to address the issue of the coup as it avoids both condemning the military and antagonizing the growing democratic movement. Chinese public officials have so far refused to refer to the government overthrow as a coup and instead called it a “major cabinet reshuffle”. China will likely pursue private engagement behind the scenes with the new government, despite its frustrations at the chaos that has ensue following the coup. Chinese action may be slow to come, but it is clear that the new military regime in Myanmar does not make China an automatic ‘winner’.  

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