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Goodwill Squandered: How Netanyahu Lost Trump's Unconditional Support

Goodwill Squandered: How Netanyahu Lost Trump's Unconditional Support

For the first time in decades, peace in the Middle East appears to be within reach through Trump's twenty-point Gaza peace plan. Beyond the contents of the agreement itself, much of the discourse has been centered around the two men spearheading it: US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

As both men addressed the Knesset on October 13th, their personal relationship appeared stronger than ever. Netanyahu repeatedly hailed Trump as ‘the greatest friend the state of Israel has ever had in the White House’, and Trump, in turn, publicly urged the Israeli President Isaac Herzog to ‘give him [Netanyahu] a pardon’. Netanyahu has been especially keen to portray the deal as a coordinated, mutual effort between him and Trump, ignoring the glaring contradictions with his maximalist rhetoric just weeks before.

Netanyahu’s claims of cooperation may be credible were it still Trump’s first term; however, repeated humiliations, such as the forced apology to his Qatari counterpart, have undermined Netanyahu’s authority since Trump returned to office. US Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff’s mere mention of Trump’s name during a speech to an Israeli crowd garnered enthusiastic cheers, while invoking Netanyahu prompted a chorus of boos — a clear display of where credit for the Gaza deal lies in the eyes of the Israeli people. Despite the fine words shared between the two leaders, they are a thin veil for a tenuous personal rapport that has directly informed US foreign policy towards Israel.

In contrast to today, Trump’s first term in office reflected a robust relationship between him and Netanyahu, fueled by mutual success. Trump’s goals — ending the Iran Nuclear Deal put in place by President Obama and securing decisive foreign policy victories — directly aligned with Netanyahu’s decades-long policy objectives. Thus, the success of the Abraham Accords, which was Trump’s defining diplomatic victory of his first term, coupled with the collapse of the Iranian nuclear deal, created extensive goodwill between the two men. These successes rendered Trump more willing to accommodate Israeli objectives that offered fewer observable benefits for the US, such as recognition of both Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and territorial claims on the Golan Heights. Over the course of a few years, Netanyahu had achieved what he had desired for decades — something for which Trump expected to be rewarded with unwavering loyalty.

Trump’s expectation of loyalty was shattered upon his loss of the 2020 presidential election to Joe Biden. Not only did Trump perform poorly with the Jewish electorate, but the call of congratulations from Netanyahu to Biden twelve hours after his victory — which Trump adamantly disputed — was seen as a stinging betrayal. In an interview for Axios in 2021, Trump bluntly summarized his thoughts on the Israeli Prime Minister: ‘f**k him’. Biden’s subsequent failure to extend the Abraham Accords to Saudi Arabia and unwavering support of Israel’s war in Gaza during his tenure further emboldened Netanyahu, signaling that, despite public objections, no US president would cease to support Israel unconditionally.

Since his reelection in 2024, Trump has cleanly broken from the approach of his predecessor. Within months of returning to the Oval Office, he conducted a tour of the Middle East, notably excluding Israel, and opened unilateral negotiations with Iran, the Yemeni Houthis, and Hamas. Despite Israeli protests, Trump has proved determined to set a policy path wholly independent from Israel. His approach is founded on his conclusion, reached after the 2020 election, that Netanyahu was an obstacle to regional peace, which is the keystone of his peacemaking agenda in his second term. On the other hand, Gulf states such as Qatar have carved out a niche for themselves in global conflict mediation. Not only do they share Trump’s war-resolving aims, but they have repeatedly made grand efforts to appeal to Trump’s ‘open transactionalism’ through lavish gifts and concrete economic commitments — a far cry from the limitless support expected by Netanyahu.

These early signs of a loss of goodwill did not dissipate after Operation Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer in June 2025. Following the dissolution of Iran’s axis of resistance, the last hurdle for Israeli regional hegemony was a military solution to Iran’s rapidly progressing nuclear program. Ultimately, Israel’s gamble succeeded, and following its own aerial campaign, on the 22nd of June, American bunker busters hit three Iranian nuclear sites. Although a clear Israeli policy victory, the personal rift between the two heads of state shaped its course. According to Israeli officials, Trump had full knowledge of Israel’s attack (refuting the claim that Netanyahu forced Trump’s hand) and had instructed them to wait until his two-month negotiation deadline, extended to Iran, had passed. Further, he cemented his ultimate authority when, on June 24th, he commanded Netanyahu on his Truth Social account to ‘BRING YOUR PILOTS HOME NOW!’ — forcing Israeli planes to wheel around mid-flight. Trump, clearly, was keeping Netanyahu on a tighter leash, without the numerous concessions of his first term.

The relationship's ultimate test of strength came on September 9th, after the failed Israeli assassination of three Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar. Not only had Netanyahu killed a citizen of a sovereign, neutral country, but he had also effectively attempted to nip Trump’s latest round of negotiations in the bud. Trump, breaking with decades of American political tradition, sided decisively with Qatar. While Trump sat holding a phone for him in the Oval Office, Netanyahu called his Qatari counterpart, publicly apologizing for the shambolic strike. The humiliating scene exemplifies how Israel, diplomatically isolated internationally, has become entirely reliant on the United States. Trump, capitalizing on Netanyahu’s moment of weakness, has used the window of opportunity to implement the current twenty-point peace deal, created with minimal Israeli input.

The Gaza deal is a far cry from the ‘total victory’ Netanyahu has promised since October 7th, and the provision for the eventual creation of a Palestinian state within it contradicts decades of his rhetoric. He has attempted to frame it as a cooperative creation, likely for reelection purposes; yet the reality is that the goodwill he once enjoyed with Trump is gone. Following his apparent betrayal after the 2020 election, Trump has been adamant to prove on every occasion that he is in total control of Netanyahu, and by extension, the foreign policy of the state of Israel. With the probable collapse of the current governing coalition, Netanyahu’s political fate lies solely in the hands of Trump; how he decides to portray their personal relationship going forward will be the key to any reelection prospects. Trump has repaid his former personal ally’s betrayal with the establishment of a clear hierarchy, no longer accommodating Israel’s interests, but forcing them in line with his own.


Image courtesy of Al Drago/Bloomberg via Getty, ©2019. Some rights reserved.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.

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