The Succession Question: the Battle over the Next Reincarnation of the Dalai Lama
As the 14th Dalai Lama approaches his 89th birthday, the question of his succession looms large. Although according to his own prediction he will live to the grand age of 113, a power struggle over one of the world’s largest and oldest religions has already begun, reflecting wider ideological and geopolitical debates in international politics.
The title of ‘Dalai Lama’ is given to the spiritual head of the Gelugpa school, dominant in Tibetan Buddhism, with the holder believed to be the reincarnation of the bodhisattva of compassion, Avalokiteśvara, one of many identified lineages of rebirths, or tulkus. The traditional system of identifying the Dalai Lama’s successor involves a combination of interpreting spiritual visions and consulting oracles. The current Dalai Lama was discovered in a small north-eastern Tibetan village in 1938 by a group of monks led there by a series of signs, including visions at an oracle lake and a rare star-shaped fungus growing on the former Dalai Lama’s shrine. He was able to address them by their Buddhist names despite never having met them before and successfully identified objects belonging to the 13th Dalai Lama. Such rituals are shaped by centuries of tradition and form the framework around which Tibetan Buddhism is practiced.
But the People’s Republic of China has other ideas. Since its annexation of Tibet in 1951, concerted efforts to control Tibetan Buddhism and claim sovereignty have made the process of selecting the next Dalai Lama extremely contentious. High levels of state surveillance and wide-ranging ‘re-education’ programmes for the nearly 7 million Tibetans still living in Tibet have raised fears that the new generation will lose their connection to traditions, language and cultural identity. The interference and erosion of Tibetan independence can be seen in the kidnapping and disappearance of Gedhun Choekyi Nyima in 1995, three days after the Dalai Lama recognised the young boy as the reincarnation of the 10th Panchen Lama (the second most prominent spiritual leader in the Gelugpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism). He was quickly replaced by Beijing’s own candidate. China’s State Administration for Religious Affairs legalised similar actions in 2007 by enacting Order Number Five, legislation granting the Chinese government the exclusive authority to validate the search for and selection of reincarnate lamas, including the Dalai Lama, despite being an officially atheist state.
More recently, Robert Barnett, a scholar of Tibet, alleged that a group of twenty-five senior Chinese officials have begun secret meetings to prepare for the selection process, with the CCP arguing that the proper method of identification is the Qing practice of the Golden Urn. The Chinese government’s continued attempts to exert their influence on Tibetan Buddhism indicates the reality that despite their decades-long effort to assimilate Tibet into China, the Dalai Lama’s unifying role and support both domestically and abroad (as shown by his winning of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989) provides an alternative power base symbolising resistance against Chinese rule in Tibet. Thus, the Chinese government has deemed control of the institution of Dalai Lama as essential to consolidating their supremacy.
Accordingly, the Dalai Lama made a written declaration in 2011 about his succession, asserting that his reincarnation will be born in a free country and accusing the CCP of ‘brazen meddling that contradicts their own political ideology’. The Panchen Lama traditionally plays a key role in the identification of the next Dalai Lama, but the illegitimacy of the CCP-selected incumbent has created ambiguity in the selection process. The Dalai Lama announced that a decision about the nature of his successor will be made when he turns 90 in 2025, promising to leave clear instructions to ensure the recognition of a legitimate reincarnation not clouded by political interests. Later interviews indicate that the traditional practice of finding child incarnations may no longer be a certainty, with the Dalai Lama suggesting that the reincarnation could be a woman, chosen while he was still alive or even that the institution could be voted on by Tibetans. He has also given up his political authority of the government-in-exile to a secular elected body, a move restricting future political claims from a CCP-selected Dalai Lama. Some now think that there will emerge two Dalai Lamas, one backed by China and the other chosen by the Dalai Lama or his close advisers after his death, creating a situation similar to that of the papal schism of the fourteenth century.
China is not the only country however with a deep interest in this issue. Since 1959, the Dalai Lama has lived in Dharamshala in India, forming a haven for thousands of Tibetan refugees who left with him or joined later, largely during the chaotic Cultural Revolution. Longstanding border tensions have strained India and China’s relationship particularly in recent years, with regular violent skirmishes and a high degree of militarisation on each side of the border. The presence of the Dalai Lama in India has increased pressure on the already fraught Sino-Indian relationship, particularly as it is thought that the Dalai Lama’s prediction that the reincarnation will be born in a ‘free country’ means they will likely be found in India. There has been a series of public interactions between the Indian Prime Minister and the Dalai Lama, with Modi releasing regular birthday greetings to the Dalai Lama, and recently the Dalai Lama praising the success of India’s Chandrayaan-3 landing on the moon. The issue of the succession of the Dalai Lama has thus added an extra layer to the continuing power struggles over influence on the global stage and leadership of the Global South between the nuclear-armed India and China, exemplified by this year’s diplomatic stalemate.
Although recent international support for the Dalai Lama has been tempered by political and economic calculations in terms of relations with China, there has been some pushback against interference in the selection of the Dalai Lama’s successor. The American Congress passed the Tibet Policy and Support Act in 2020, the first American law over the issue of succession, making it official US policy that the succession of the Dalai Lama is to be decided solely by Tibetan Buddhists. Two Chinese officials were also sanctioned last year by the US for serious human rights violations in Tibet. While European states have not enacted similar legislation, the EU has reiterated its position that China should respect the succession of the Dalai Lama ‘in accordance with Tibetan Buddhist norms’. Support has also been offered by Japan, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Sweden and Canada, among others.
Moreover, the identification of the tenth reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, the leader of Mongolian Buddhists and the third highest lama in the Gelugpa spiritual hierarchy, is enormously significant in setting up leadership of the future of Tibetan Buddhism. This March, the Dalai Lama announced that an eight-year-old American-born Mongolian boy had been identified as the reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu. This provided a direct spiritual and cultural link to the origins of Mongolia’s national identity, while simultaneously indicating a crucial global angle to the role, considering the child’s American citizenship and his family’s well-established political and business links. Mongolia’s complicated historical relationship with its neighbours, combined with its current economic dependence on China has meant this decision was complex and by no means inevitable, with China blocking a crucial border entry point and imposing new fees on commodity exports as a warning after the Dalai Lama’s 2016 trip where he apparently identified the reincarnation. Now, with the legitimacy of the Panchen Lama compromised, this child will be crucial to the continuation of an independent Tibetan Buddhist tradition and the spiritual lives of Buddhists around the world.
Image courtesy of Christopher Michel via Wikimedia Commons, ©2012. Some rights reserved.
The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the wider St. Andrews Foreign Affairs Review team.
